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Report of the
December, 1935, Conference

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF

TAX ADMINISTRATORS

INDIANAPOLIS,

INDIANA

December 3 and 4, 1935

IN

FOREWORD

PREPARING this report for publication, we have attempted
to arrange the material in a manner that will make it most
useful to tax administrators and others interested in tax
matters.
To readers of the report who are not members of the Association it perhaps should be pointed out that the majority of
articles contained herein are extemporaneous talks rather than
prepared papers. We believe that whatever this form of expression may lose in polish it gains in frankness and freshness.
It will be noted that in the discussions printed at the close
of the articles, there is a frequent difference of opinion among
the administrators. These questions and answers represent the
fulfillment of one of the foremost purposes of the National
Association of Tax Administrators-to provide an open forum
for free discussion of tax problems among those who must
administer the tax laws of our country.
Organized in 1934 as the National Association of State
Tax Administrators, the word "State" was dropped from the
title by vote of the Association at the 1935 conference, and
membership restrictions were extended in order that other tax
officials might be eligible to membership.
C. A. JACKSON,
Secretary-Treasurer.
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CaliFornia AdoptsUse Ta x
to Protect Local Trade
With Security of Interstate Commerce Established, Action is Necessary to Remove
Inequalities Suffered by Domestic Commerce, Author of Law Says
By ROGER J. TRAYNOR*
Member of the Faculty of the University
of California and Consultant to
the California State Board
of Equalization

HE Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution has served the
development of interstate commerce long and well. The security of
such commerce is now as firmly established as the unity of the nation, yet its
special privileges continue even though
the original reasons for them have disappeared. The tables are now turned,
with domestic commerce in the less secure position. While hitherto maintaining itself under discriminatory tax burdens, it now struggles under their additional weight at a time when even slight
differentials may make or break a business. All losses of local business to outside competitors result in losses of
revenue not recouped by other states, for
the corresponding gains to interstate business escape taxation altogether. More
serious, however, is the permanent impairment of local business, which is at best
only partially counterbalanced by increased orders from other states. (See
the excellent study by E. M. Perkins,
The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce, 12 North Carolina Law
Review 99.) The rapid development of
state sales taxation has rendered a serious
situation critical, and the need for a
remedy, which brought into being the
National Association of State Tax Administrators, has become urgent. If state
sales taxation is to continue, states must
find some way of equalizing the competition which now threatens their sources
of revenue as it threatens their local
businesses.
*Mr. Traynor is Associate Professor of Law at the
University of California School of Jurisprudence,
Berkeley, California, and is faculty editor-in-chief
of the California Law Review. He was legal adviser
to the California Tax Research Bureau, State Board
of Equalization, from January, 1932, to August,
1933, when he became acting director of the Sales
Tax Division. He has been a consultant to the
State Board of Equalization since January, 1934.

The solution is in no sense to grant
special privileges to local business, but to
remove those special privileges from
interstate business. Three obstacles stand
in the way of such a solution: (1) repeated pronouncements by the United
States Supreme Court that the regulation
of commerce among the states, delegated
to Congress by the United States Constitution, prohibits the application of state
excise taxes with respect to transactions
in interstate commerce; [Robbins v.
Shelby County Taxing District (1886)
120 U. S. 489; Statenburgh v. Hennick
(1889) 129 U. S. 141; Brennan v. Titusville (1894) 153 U. S. 289; Stockard v.
Morgan (1902) 185 U. S. 27; Caldwell v.
North Carolina (1903) 187 U. S. 622;
Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. Sims
(1903) 191 U. S. 441; Rearick v. Pennsylvania (1906) 203 U. S. 507; Dozier v.
Alabama (1909) 218 U. S. 124; Crenshaw v. Arkansas (1912) 227 U. S. 389;
Rogers v. Arkansas (1912) 227 U. S.
401; Stewart v. Michigan (1913) 232 U.
S. 665; Davis v. Virginia (1914) 236 U.
S. 697; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland (1925) 268 U. S. 325.] (2) decisions
that a state cannot tax activities beyond
its borders; [St. Louis Cotton Compress
v. Arkansas (1922) 260 U. S. 346; Provident Savings Ass'n v. Kentucky (1915)
239 U. S. 103; Compania de Tabacos v.
Collector (1927) 275 U. S. 87; Standard Oil Co. v. California (1934) 291 U.
S. 242; Compare Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v. Conn (1926) 272 U. S. 295;
Graniteville Manufacturing Co. v. Query
(1931) 283 U. S. 376.] (3) restriction
of a state's collection functions to its own
limits. [See Colorado v. Harbeck (1921)
232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357; Moore v.
Mitchell (1929, C. C. A. 2d) 30 F. (2d)
600.]

Rate Same as Sales Tax
The California Use Tax Act (Cal.
Stats. 1935, ch. 361) takes account of
these conditions in its plan to put its own
retailers on the same terms with out-ofstate competitors. It imposes an excise
13

tax of 3% of the sales price upon the
storage, use or other consumption of tangible personal property purchased from
retailers on or after July 1, 1935, for
storage, use or other consumption in the
state. The rate is thus identical with the
sales tax rate. The act does not apply
to property subject to the sales tax; it
thus directs itself principally to that
property purchased outside the state or
in interstate commerce, and applies regardless of whether the retailer is located
in the state or in another state or foreign
country. Liability for the tax falls upon
the person storing, using or otherwise
consuming the property and is extinguished only when he pays the tax either
to the retailer from whom he must receive a receipt or to the state when the
retailer maintains no place of business in
the state. Retailers in the first instance
must collect the tax at the time of sale
and make quarterly returns thereof. In
all other cases the consumer must make
such returns directly. Retailers who
maintain no place of business in the state
are neither required to collect the tax nor
permitted to do so except upon certain
conditions. The State Board of Equalization may require returns for other than
quarterly periods. All retailers making
sales of tangible personal property to
California consumers are required to
register with the Board.
It is the intent of the use tax merely
to supplement the sales tax by imposing
upon those subject to it a tax burden
equivalent to that of the sales tax with
the same specific exemptions in each
case. The act accordingly limits the tax
to the "use . . . of property purchased
use . . ." within the state. Problems

for

requiring administrative interpretation
must be analyzed in the light of this
double condition. Circumstances might
compel, for example, the use of property
within the state not intended for such
use at the time of purchase, and previously used elsewhere. Thus a family
moving into California with furniture it
had used for several years would clearly
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be exempt from the tax. Cases can
arise, however, where a formal use elsewhere might disguise an actual intent to
use within the state the property purchased. For the most part such an intent would reveal itself in the circumstances of the purchase and the subsequent use of the property. There could
be little doubt that the use tax would
apply to the use of an automobile purchased in Nevada by a California resident and registered in California shortly
thereafter. Since the variety of possible
situations could hardly be covered by a
rigid rule or regulation doubtful cases
must be submitted to administrative
interpretation.

Legality First Question

statutes imposed license taxes with
respect to sales of gasoline within the
state. The court declared:
"But appellants question the right to
invoke other statutes to support the
validity of the act assailed. To stand the
test of constitutionality, they say, the
act must be constitutional 'within its
four corners' that is, considered by itself.
The question of constitutional validity is
not to be determined by artificial standards. What is required is that state
action, whether through one agency or
another, or through one enactment or
more than one, shall be consistent with
the restrictions of the Federal Constitution. There is no demand in that Constitution that the state shall put its requirements in any one statute. It may
distribute them as it sees fit, if the result, taken in its totality, is within the
state's constitutional power." (286 U. S.
472, 479)

The first question that arises is
whether the Act imposes an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce
either by levying a discriminatory tax, by
charging certain retailers with collection,
Gregg Case Meets Objection
or by taxing the use of property in an
The
California Use Tax operates in
interstate business.
It is now beyond doubt that the stor- conjunction with the sales tax to exact
from all consumers of tangible personal
age, use or other consumption of tangible
personal property within the borders of a property within the state a tax amounting
state is a proper subject of an excise tax, to 3% of the sale price of the property.
even though the property be of out-of- The fact that the sales tax is in form
state origin. [Bowman v. Continental Oil upon the retailer, while the use tax is in
form upon the consumer, affords no basis
Co. (1921) 256 U. S. 642; Hart Refinerfor distinguishing the Gregg case, since
ies v. Harmon (1929) 278 U. S. 499;
there was virtually the same difference
Nashville C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249.] It might be between the South Carolina statutes involved in that case. Unless particular
argued, however, that the exemption of
significance is attached to the fact that
property subject to the sales tax constithe latter statutes involved only one
tutes a prima facie discrimination against
commodity, or to the special nature of
interstate commerce. If the Act actually
discriminated against goods of out-of- that commodity, the Gregg case effecstate origin, it would violate the com- tively meets the contention that the Calimerce clause even though interstate fornia Use Tax involves a forbidden distransit had ceased and the goods had long rimination by exempting property reached
since come to rest in the state. [Welton by the sales tax.
Even though the California Use Tax
v. Missouri (1875) 91 U. S. 275; BethleAct involves no unconstitutional discrimhem Motors Corporation v. Flynt (1921)
256 U. S. 421. See also Darnell & Son v. ination in the light of the Gregg Case,
Memphis (1908) 208 U. S. 113.] If dis- the question remains whether it can
crimination were to be determined solely constitutionally charge with tax collecfrom the four corners of the Act, there tion those retailers maintaining a place
of business within the state. Only by
could be little doubt of its invalidity.
this method could the Act obviate the
The Supreme Court, however, repudiated
difficulties of collecting the
insuperable
Co.
v.
Query,
Gregg
Dyeing
this test in
tax exclusively from the numberless users
[(1932) 286 U. 5. 472. See also Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford (1935) 49 P. of diverse commodities, and it finds
(2d) 14 holding valid, in reliance upon authority for such a method in the rethe Gregg Case a Washington tax essen- cent Supreme Court decision in Monatially similar to the California use tax.] motor Oil Company v. Johnson, [(1934)
holding that other related statutes must 292 U. 5. 86. See also the cases holding
be considered in conjunction with the that a state may require a national bank
to collect a tax on shareholders that could
one assailed as discriminatory. That case
not have been imposed upon the bank.
involved the validity of a South Carolina
Nat. Bank v. Commonwealth (1869) 76
from
imported
gasoline
upon
tax
license
other states, and stored for future use U. S. (9 Wall.) 353; First Nat. Bank of
within the state. Other South Carolina Aberdeen v. County of Chehalis (1897)
14

166 U. S. 440; Merchants and Manfacturers' Nat. Bank v. Penn (1897) 147
U. S. 461; Home Saving Bank v. Des
Moines (1907) 205 U. S. 503. See also
Pierce Oil Co. v. Hopkins (1924) 264 U.
S. 137 holding that a state statute requiring sellers of gasoline to collect a
tax from their purchasers did not violate
due process.] This case involved an
Iowa statute requiring all distributors to
collect a tax on the use of gasoline, regardless of whether the gasoline was sold
interstate or intrastate. The court held
that:
"The appellant, however, says that the
state officials have required it to report
and pay the tax on shipments made from
Oklahoma direct to dealers in Iowa who
are appellant's customers and in respect
to such transactions the burden on interstate commerce is obvious. But if the
gasoline so imported is intended to be
used in Iowa for motor vehicle fuel it is
subject to tax

. . . The statute obvi-

ously was not intended to reach transactions in interstate commerce, but to
tax the use of motor vehicle fuel after it
had come to rest in Iowa, and the requirement that the appellant as shipper
into Iowa shall, as agent of the state, report and pay the tax on the gasoline thus
coming into the state for use by others
on whom the tax falls imposes no unconstitutional burden either upon interstate
commerce or upon the appellant." (292
U. S. 8 6, 94.)

Trend in Decisions Noted
It may be that in subjecting to a use
tax that which could not be reached by
a sales tax and in requiring a seller to
collect the tax to which he himself could
not be subjected the California Use Tax
resorts to a measure of indirection. But
the netessity of harmonizing the equitable
purposes of the Act with established
precedents compels the careful selection
of its subject and the manner of its imposition. The act would seem particularly free from criticism on this ground
in view of recent decisions evidencing a
growing severity toward the special bounties enjoyed by interstate commerce. [See
Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania (1935) 294
U. 5. 169. See also Eastern Air Transport Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm
(1932) 285 U. 5.147; Nashville etc. Ry
Co. v. Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249;
Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport Inc,
(1933) 289 U. S. 249.]
The commerce clause raises onemr
constitutional question with regard t~th
use tax, rgamely, its application V
use or storage of property shse
used in interstate commerce. If
use of the property withinthe
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use in interstate commerce the tax would
seem clearly inapplicable under the
holdings in Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky [(1929) 279 U. S. 245) and
Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone
Co. (1935) 294 U. S. 384.] The Helson
case held that a Kentucky tax on the sale,
distribution or use of gasoline within the
state could not apply to gasoline purchased outside the state, never stored
therein, and used exclusively in interstate commerce. The Cooney Case invalidated a license tax on telephone companies measured by the number of telephones in intrastate use on the ground
that all of the telephones were available
and substantially used in interstate commerce. The Helson case involved a use
in interstate commerce not preceded by
any storage or local use in the state. The
Cooney Case involved a use which might
have been preceded by storage or local
use neither of which, however, were subject to the tax.

California Act Specific
The California Act, on the contrary,
specifically taxes such storage or use.
The validity of such taxation was sustained in Nashville, Chattanooga etc. Ry.
v. Wallace and Edelman v. Boeing Air
Transport Company. [see Wiloil Corp.
v. Pennsylvania (1935) 294 U. S. 169.
See also Eastern Air Transport Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Comm. (1932) 285
U. S. 147; Nashville etc. Ry. Co. v.
Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249; Edelman
v. Boeing Air Transport Inc. (1933)
288 U. S. 249; Edelman v. Boeing Air
Transport Inc. (1933) 289 U. S. 249.)
In the Nashville Case an interstate
carrier purchased gasoline outside the
.state, stored it within the state and later
withdrew it for use in interstate carriage.
The court held it subject to a privilege
tax on persons and corporations engaged
in the business of selling, storing or distributing gasoline in the state on the
ground that the power to tax the gasoline
as property after coming to rest in the
state includes the power to tax its storage and withdrawal. The court said:
"Here the tax is imposed on the successive exercise of two of those powers,
the storage and withdrawal from storage
of the gasoline. Both powers are completely exercised before the use of gasoline as an instrument of commerce and
the burden is too indirect and remote
from the function of interstate commerce
itself to transgress constitutional limitations." (288 U. 5. 249, 268.)
A similar use of gasoline in the Edelman Case was held subject to a tax on
the use or sale of gasoline in the state.
In holding that this tax imposed no un-

constitutional burden on interstate commerce the court stated
"As the tax has been administratively
construed and applied, the tax is not
levied upon the consumption of gasoline
in furnishing motive power for respondent's interstate planes. The tax is applied
to the stored gasoline as it is withdrawn
from the storage tanks at the airport and
placed in the planes. No tax is collected
for gasoline consumed in respondent's
planes either on coming into the state or
on going out. It is at the time of withdrawal alone that 'use' is measured for
the purpose of the tax. The stored gasoline is deemed to be 'used' within the
state and therefore subject to the tax,
when it is withdrawn from the tanks . . .
"A state may validly tax the 'use' to
which gasoline is put in withdrawing it
from storage within the state, and placing it in the tanks of the planes, notwithstanding that its ultimate function
is to generate motive power for carrying
on interstate commerce." (289 U. S.
249, 251.)
The Helson Case would clearly prevent the application of a use tax only
where the interstate use, as in the case of
rolling stock, preceded the introduction
of the property into the state and continued thereafter. It seems clear in the
Nashville and Edelman Cases, however,
that once property has come to rest in
the state, acts up to the very point of
consumption were regarded as preliminary
to the interstate use held not taxable in
the Helson Case, and were not themselves
immune from taxation. If the withdrawal
of gasoline and the filling of tanks for
immediate use in interstate commerce
can be subjected to use taxation it is
difficult to see how the storage or for
that matter the installation of tangible
personal property could be immune.

Property Tax, May Be Claim

It might be argued that the use tax is
a property tax which, by virtually limiting itself to property of out-of-state
origin, violates not only the commerce
clause, but the uniformity provision of
the state constitution. This interpretation of the use tax would look for its
authority to Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co. [(1924) 255 U. S. 288.] The
court there held that a tax on the removal of whiskey from bonded warehouses in the state violated the uniformity provision of the Kentucky constitution. It declared:
"The whole value of the whiskey depends upon the owner's right to get it
from the place where the law has compelled him to put it, and to tax the
right is to tax the value. To levy a tax
by reason of ownership of property is to
tax the property." (255 U. S. 288, 294.)
In Bromley v. McCaughn, [(1929)
280 U. S. 138. See also Anderson v. McNeir (1927) 16 F (2d) 970, 974] however, the court sustained a federal gift
tax against the contention that it was a
property tax necessitating apportionment,
Limitation Avoids Problems
on the ground that "a tax imposed upon
The limitation of the use tax to the a particular use of property or the exerstorage, use or other consumption of cise of a single power over property inciproperty within the state avoids the dental to ownership is an excise which
problems of due process that might arise need not be apportioned." It contrasted
from the extension of a sales tax by con- this with the Dawson Case, holding that
sumer states, to interstate commerce
the latter supported the proposition
under federal permissive legislation or
that a tax "upon all the uses to which
otherwise. The privilege of selling and property may be put, or upon the exerthe act of sale would probably be located
cise of a single power indispensable to
in the state of origin of the commodity the enjoyment of all the others, would
thus rendering the selection of any other
be in effect a tax upon the property."
The Dawson case thus raises certain
subject of a sales tax in the consuming
state of dubious constitutionality. [St. questions. Upon how many uses could a
Louis Cotton Compress v. Arkansas tax be levied without becoming a prop(1922) 260 U. 5. 346; Provident Savings erty tax? What uses would be indisAss'n v. Kentucky (1915), 239 U. S. pensable to the enjoyment of all others?
The interpretation of the use tax as a
103; Compania de Tabacos v. Collector
(1927) 275 U. 5. 87; Standard Oil Co. property tax was not advanced in any of
v. California (1934) 291 U. S. 242;
the cases involving taxes on use or stor15

~KAI

Compare Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v.
Conn. (1926) 272 U. S. 295; Graniteville Manufacturing Co. v. Query (1931)
283 U. S. 376.] In contrast, the storage,
use or other consumption of property
within a state is clearly within its jurisdiction to tax. [See Air Transport Inc.
v. South Carolina Tax Comm.; Nashville
etc. Ry. Co. v. Wallace; Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport Inc., (1933) 289 U.
S. 249. See also Palmetto Fire Ins. Co.
v. Conn.; Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query
(1931) 283 U. S. 376; Bowman v. Continental Oil Co. (1921) 256 U. S. 642;
Hart Refineries v. Harmon (1929) 278
U. S. 499; Nashville C. & St. L. R. R.
Co. v. Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249.]
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age. In any event, the California use
tax does not apply to the use or storage
of property to be resold, nor does it
have the usual characteristics of a property tax. It does not recur annually, but
falls only once on any specific property;
it is not imposed on a fixed day; it
does not, in other words, fall upon the
owner "merely because he is owner, regardless of the use or disposition made
of the property."
Even if it were a property tax it
would still not constitute a discrimination against interstate commerce, in the
light of the Gregg Case, so long as other
taxes, property or otherwise, imposed a
comparable burden upon domestic commerce. The second contention raised by
the interpretation of the tax as a property tax would have no application in
California, where the uniformity provision of the state constitution does not
apply to personal property.

Collection Biggest Task
The most difficult problem for a state,
however, is not the establishment of a
non-discriminatory tax within its own
jurisdiction, but the collection of such a
tax. Any attempt to collect a use tax
from countless individual users of commodities would involve so much supervision and expense as to vitiate the exercise of a state's jurisdiction over them.
The users might have a clear responsibility for tax payment, but they could
evade it by virtue of their numbers. The
imposition of responsibility on a smaller
group, however, would be equally ineffective if the state had no jurisdiction to
enforce collection. While it would be
desirable, for example, to localize collection through a comparatively small
group of retailers, this would be precluded, since the members of such a
group are subject to different jurisdictions. If a retailer had no place of
business in the taxing state, he could be
compelled neither to pay a tax imposed
upon him nor to collect a tax imposed
upon his local customers. A state could
not normally send its officers into another
state to audit the books of a retailer. It
would probably find no remedy in its
courts if the retailer had no attachable
property within the state. It might thus
be in the embarrassing position of requesting, tax payments from out-of-state
retailers which it could not collect in the
event of refusal.
Such a situation
would be particularly undesirable where
domestic consumers had themselves paid
the tax to the retailers for remittance to
the state.
The California use tax seeks to obviate these difficulties by localizing collec-

tion through retailers, but only so far as
is consistent with its own jurisdiction. It
requires collection from consumers on
behalf of the state only from retailers
maintaining places of business within the
state, or others who upon proper showing have obtained the consent of the
State Board of Equalization to collect the
tax. While it is thus still compelled to
exact tax payments directly from those
purchasers from retailers without places
of business within the state, it at least
limits that group to a size susceptible to
effective administration.

A ct Provides for Service
In regard to civil actions for the enforcement of collection, the California
act provides for service of process upon
any agent or clerk employed in the state
by any retailer in a place of business
maintained by such retailer in the state,
and the transmission by registered mail
of a copy of the process to the retailer
at his home office. The validity of such
service upon a corporation engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce, at
least regarding those whose activities in
the state transcend mere solicitation of
orders, is assured by International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky. [(1916) 234 U.
S. 579.] Quite recently Henry L. Doherty
& Co. v. Goodman [(1935) 55 Sup. Ct.
553. See J. P. McBaine, Service upon a
Non-Resident by Service Upon His Agent
(1935) 23 California Law Review 482.]
removed the doubts left by Holmes'
opinion in Flexner v. Farson [(1919) 248
U. S. 289] regarding the validity of
service upon a non-resident by service
upon his agent. While the case did not
involve interstate commerce, it would
seem that once the propriety of service
upon a non-resident by service upon his
agent is established, the interstate character of the business should no more
obstruct service upon individuals than
service upon corporations. Once proper
service is had, a judgment obtained in
this state might form, although the question is still open, the basis of an action
in the courts of another state. [See
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. (1888) 127
U. 5. 265; Moore v. Mitchell (1929) 30
F. (2d) 600. Cf. People of State of New
York v. Coe Mfg. Co. (1934) 112 N. J.
L. 536, 172 Atl. 198, cert. den. (1934)
55 Sup. Ct. 89; (1935) 83 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 387; Hazelwood, Full Faith and
Credit Clause as Applied to Enforcement of Tax Judgments (1934) 19 Marquette L. Rev. 10.) The Act is additionally implemented in this regard by
making the tax to be collected by retailers a debt owing to the state, thus
again attempting to meet the doctrine
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that one state cannot sue for taxes in
the courts of another.

Reciprocation May Be Answer
The California Use Tax Act seeks by
unilateral action to circumvent difficulties
that might well be facilitated or abolished
altogether by reciprocal action among
the states. North Carolina has taken an
excellent step in this direction by making its courts available for the enforcement of collection to any other states
which would reciprocate that privilege.
(1935) (North Carolina H. B. 332.)
Much might also be accomplished by the
exchange
of similar privileges that
seemed essential to effective tax collection. As matters now stand, even if the
states, in order to subject interstate and
intrastate commerce to the same burdens, had the power to tax all sales
directly, they would still lack jurisdiction
to enforce collection. Federal legislation
itself could do little to remedy this situation without co-operative action from
the states. No group could more appropriately encourage such reciprocal legislation than the National Association of
Tax Administrators.
MR. SMITH (Missouri): Have California
courts passed on your Use Tax Law yet?

PROFESSOR TRAYNOR:

No, but Washington

has a similar tax and the Washington Supreme
Court has passed upon that Act, holding it
valid so far as the State Constitution is concerned and so far as interstate commerce is
concerned. That is in Vancouver Oil Company against Henneford. It is in 49th Pacific.
MR. SMITH:

Another question:

If I un-

derstood you correctly, if Mrs. Blivins, out
here at Podunk, orders some red house slippers and a calico dress from Montgomery
Ward & Company, in Chicago, you make an
effort to collect that tax?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR:

Yes, she is supposed

to return that tax to California, just as if she
had bought it from a California retailer.
MR. REYNOLDS (Michigan): Professor, you
mean to say that from each individual in

California who orders from a mail order house
in Chicago, an attempt is made by the state
to collect that tax?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: That is right.
MR. REYNOLDS: From all individuals?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: That is right.
MR. REYNOLDS: I should think that that

would be rather prohibitive.
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: I expect it would be
very difficult. It is undoubtedly a heroic task.
MR. PIERCE (California):

As Professor

Traynor pointed out, where that retailer
maintains a place of business in the state, the
law makes him responsible for the collection
of it and, in the case of the two principal
mail order houses--that is, Montgomery
Ward and Sears-Roebuck-of course, they do
maintain places of business in our state, retail
stores. So, answering specifically Mr. Smith's
question, in that case it would have been
collected directly from the retailer and there
would be no difficulty at all.
MR. REYNOLDS: Even if they maintai fl
branch in the state, yout still attempt to collect it
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MR. PIERCE: Where they have no branch
in the state at all, as Professor Traynor said
in his paper, then the problem is different because it would be useless to try to collect it
from the seller in the other state, particularly
where no tax liability would be in dispute in
the other state.
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: I think we have a
sufficient number of retailers with places of
business in the state to render this difficult
problem workable. The large users of property, like the various corporations and utility
companies and so forth,-render the collection
otherwise rather simple. So that reduces the
users that we attempt to collect the tax from
to a less formidable number, but I do recognize the force of that question. It is a very
difficult problem; however, perhaps no more
so that collecting an income tax. Many objections were made to the personal income
tax on the same ground: that you ask individuals to make returns and tell you what
their income is. Now, in time, I suppose that
the force of that objection will be met just as
it was in the case of the income tax.

Law Not in Courts
May I ask if you have had
any difficulty in collecting this tax or has anyone resorted to the courts to stop you from
MR. SMIrrH:

collecting it ?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Not yet, no.
MR. SMrrT: Now, the mail order housethe main house in Chicago-will notify its

branch house in California that they have
shipped a dress to Mrs. Blivins, at Podunkis that the way it is handled-or that they
have sold three dollars and forty-five cents
worth of merchandise to her?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: The mail order branch
in California is required to make the return.
MR. SMITH: And they get the information
from the house in Chicago?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, that is right.
MR. MARTIN (New Jersey): I would like

to ask if you can tell us whether there are any
cases now pending in the Federal

Court

where the parties are carrying either the California or the Washington Use Tax to the
United States Supreme Court.
PROFEssOR TRAYNOR: I think the Washington tax is going up, but I am not positive.
: I would like to ask, ProfesMR.

penalty is in connection with
of filing of returns, as far as
is concerned, if the consumer
return.
MR. PIERCE: There is a ten per cent penalty.
Do you have a provision for
MR. -:
civil action?
sor, what the
this question
the consumer
fails to file a

MR. PIERCE: Yes, there is a provision for
civil action, too.

Branch Office Liable
MR. Surrm (Georgia): I don't know
whether Mr. Smith, of Missouri, made that
exactly clear, or not
In. the event property is sent from SearsRoebuck & Company, at Chicago, and it is

shipped direct from Sears-Roebuck & Company, Chicago, to the customer in California,
then you, under your law, attempt to hold the
branch office of Sears-Roebuck & Company,

in California, responsible ?
*PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: That is right. Yes,
our theory is that, so far as possible, the tax
must be collected from retailers because of
the contention that has just been made, which

lies back of the questions, I think, that have
been asked: The insuperable job of collecting

it from countless numbers of users. So, so
far as possible, we attempt, and are relying
upon this case of Monamotor Oil Company
against Johnson to get the tax from retailers
because it is obviously easier to get it from a
hundred retailers than it is from ten thousand
customers.
We didn't want to be faced with the embarrassing situation of requiring the retailer
to collect it and have that retailer say, "Get
the tax from the consumer," and then coming
to Chicago or Indiana with a demand for the
tax and have him tell us that we were not
going to get it. We would be remediless. It
would have been a very embarrassing and
insufferable situation. So, in the process of
drafting this legislation, we hit upon the
plan of confining this obligation of collecting the tax, or the privilege of collecting itsome retailers want to do it-only to those
who have a place of business in the state.
Now, the object of that is, first, to get

jurisdiction over such retailer so that service
of process can be had when we get a judgment against him and, secondly, so that he
would have taxable values in the state that
we could attach and levy execution on in
support of that judgment.
Now, those are the big reasons back of it.
The State of California has the privilege of

entering and auditing the books, say, of SearsRoebuck & Company, to make sure that the
sales, which have been through the home
office, are reported by the branch office.
I do think, however, if the law is to work
as effectively as is set out within its own provisions, reciprocal legislation is going to be
required, but I don't think those difficulties,
serious as they are, are insuperable. It is a
difficult job, but it seems to me that the need
of additional revenues of the states makes
necessary some kind of effort of this kind, and
it is my conviction that, whether you get
federal legislation or what not, you are going
to be faced with just the type of problem

that Mr. Reynolds and you people are raising. It is a problem which is inherent in our
system of government: that the state tax collection functions end at its boundary line,

and the only remedy that I see for it is along
the line of the very splendid step that has

been taken by North Carolina. That legislation, alone, would be of immense value in all
the states. I think it can go much farther,

but it is an extremely encouraging thing.
North Carolina has certainly done something.
MR. SMITH (Georgia): I am glad to hear

that.
MR. WIMSEY (Illinois): Professor Traynor, if you had a mail order house in California which was shipping out to Nevada, for
retail consumption, you say there would be
no tax on the merchandise so shipped?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: No. This act applies
only to goods which are consumed in the
State of California.
MR. WIMSEY: It applies to Sears-Roebuck

and concerns of that kind, outside of the
state, which are shipping goods into the state ?

PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, that is right.
MR.
- : Let us assume that I am a

resident of California and I import a fur
coat from, let us say, Marshall Field & Company, Chicago; and let us assume further
that they have no local branch in California.
If I follow the law, as a practical matter, I
will make a return and pay the tax on the
fur coat ?
PROFE.SSOR TRAYNOR: Yes.
MR.
- : Purely from administrative
standpoint, suppose I don't. Do I ever hear
from it again? What efforts are made toward

17

enforcement ? Is there a check made of the
receipt of the fur coat by me from Chicago?
I am purely interested in enforcement and
administrative efforts. Is there any attempt
made to run me down?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Well, our Act has
just been in effect one quarter. We haven't
audited the accounts of people like that. I
think much can be done in the way of getting
reports from express companies and railroad
companies and from investigations by the
investigators and administrators in the employ of the Board. As to many small things
-say like jewelry and so forth-I imagine
there will be much evasion-tax avoidancebut it won't be the first tax that has been
avoided. Inherent in the nature of it, it has
the difficulty which you mention.

Merchants Co-operate
MR.
: Professor Traynor, have the
mail order companies sought to defeat the
purpose of this Act or are they co-operating
with you?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, they are co-operating.
MR.
: You are getting returns from
branch offices of, say, Sears-Roebuck and
Montgomery Ward?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, sir.
MR. FORT (Tennessee): I just want to say,
Mr. President, that we have a use tax in Ten-

nessee, applicable to tobacco. It was passed

in July and it is working very well so far.
MR. PIERCE: There has been a good bit of
discussion about the return from the branch
in California. I think we will have to clarify
that.
There is only one return, of course, made
normally by any such corporation which may
have a series of offices, of course, in California,
but has its principal place of business, say, in
Illinois. It makes a consolidated return. The
home office reports for the entire business
that it does for its branch offices in interstate
commerce, and the form of our return is such
that it really requires that to be done.
I have one of those forms here and it may
serve to illustrate the method employed.
The return is entitled "Sales and Use Tax

Return." Every one of these firms, of course,

has to make a sales tax return.. So -it automatically gets this form. After the usual sales
tax items, there appears, down here as an
additional item, this: "Computations of use
tax required to be collected from consumer,"
and, then: "Total sales price of tangible personal property sold for storage,' use or other
consumption in California and exempt from
the retail sales tax as sales in interstate commerce or sales made outside this state." So
that specific question is asked every retailer
who does business in California and, if he
makes a correct return, he has to put something down there if he actually did it, and,
of course, as Professor Traynor said, all of
these returns are subject to our audit.
There is, of course, a very definite, practical
difficulty, to which he referred, that, in the
event accurate accounts of these out of state
shipments are not kept in California and the
taxpayer should deny us access to its records,
kept outside the state, our authority to go
outside the state is, of course, as you know,
exceedingly limited, but, if we were to have

some sort of co-operation, for example, from

the state of origin, as would be possible under
the North Carolina statute, that difficulty

would be met. However, quite aside from
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that, it isn't as difficult as it might appear for
the reason that we have very definite jurisdiction over the type of records to be kept by
persons who are liable for the sales tax or the
use tax as long as they are subjected to our
jurisdiction at all and, as he has indicated to
you, there has been no great difficulty.

Large Collection Indicated
Now, I suppose that you are all wondering,
of course, what does it really pay ? What is
it producing ? The revenue, naturally, would
not be comparatively as large for the first
quarter as you might anticipate later, but,
even for the first quarter-that would be for
the three months of July, August and September of this year-we have actually collected,
thus far, considerably over three hundred
thousand dollars from the use tax alone and,
at that rate, it is very easy to see that the
total collection will be at least a million and
a half a year. I think it will be much nearer
two million per year, conservatively. So,
while that might seem something of a drop
in the bucket as compared to our sales tax
collections, which are in the neighborhood of
sixteen million dollars a quarter, it is still a
substantial item, and one reason why the
sales tax collections have held up so well during the last quarter, I am reliably informed, is
because of the operation of the use tax. A
good many items that I think would not be
reflected in the sales tax are there just because we have a use tax.
So from every standpoint it isn't merely an
experiment in the great unknown, but we
are actually doing something that we set out
to do. We do not, of course, feel that it is an
ideal form of taxation, for the very reasons
that have been indicated: that is, that it is
difficult to get returns from individual consumers who buy from merchants without
places of business in California, but, between
that horn of the dilemma and the dilemma of
having our local merchants deprived of a lot
of business because of the circumstance that
we are unable to reach that type of interstate
trade at all, we think that the difficulty in
enforcement is to be preferred.
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for that. That problem is essentially analogous to the problem that comes up in double
taxation in income tax, for example, where
residents are taxed upon income from all
sources and non-residents from sources within
the state. A non-resident is taxable upon the
income that he earned in California. In the
income tax laws, there is a provision that
guards against it. Something like that, I
think, should be worked out in this Act, but,
writing a statute and getting all of the
wrinkles out of it the first time you write it,
then taking it from the typewriter to a Committee on Revenue and Taxation and getting
it out of there with all of these things in it,
is another matter, too. On some of those
ideas that we had it wasn't so easy to convince a busy Legislature during the hurried
days of the close of the session.
I think that you have put your finger on
a very important point. We do not want to
have double taxation. All we want to do is
put our retailers upon equal terms with outof-state retailers. Something should be done
to avoid double taxation if this use tax idea
is to spread.
MR. : May I ask one more question? You mentioned a while ago that you

have access to the express companies' books.
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: I think that access
could be obtained as an accommodation to
our state.
MR.
: How about parcel post and
the mails ?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: No, sir, I don't think
we could get access to those.

roads, but, if you listen to our radio programs, you will find that that is what they
have designated the State of Indiana. Indianapolis is the "Crossroads of America."
Certainly there is nothing of greater im-

MR. DoYAL (Georgia): From your experience with it, you wouldn't think it would

PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: Yes, we, in CaliforAia, the way our statute is now written, would

collect the use tax. There would be a double
tax. In Washington there is provision made

Sales tax administrators who believe
they are having a hard time making
people "enjoy" paying their pennies may
rejoice that they do not have the job of
making Russian sales taxes popular.
Paul Haensel, writing in The Tax
Magazine, reports tax rates on many
articles in Russia. Here are some samples:
Toilet soap, 69 to 72%.
Cigarettes, 79.3 to 91%; cigars, 72%;
tobacco, 79.3 to 80%.
Salt, 66% and higher in some cases;
butter 26%.
Kerosene, 90.5% in cities and 93% in
villages.
Ice cream, 33%; ice cream containing
eggs, 26%.
Ready-made clothing, 3.5%; knit wear,
38%.
Mirrors, 40%; china, 8%.
Sports goods, 21%; rayon goods, 71%;
trunks, 25%.
Vodka, 88.8%.
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Links with Sales Tax
.be a practical tax, from an administrative
standpoint, unless you did have a general
sales tax, would you? Suppose you just simply had the use tax. Wouldn't the cost of
administration of just that tax alone be prohibitive ?
PROFESSOR TRAYNOR: I think it would be
really more effective in connection with the
sales tax. It couldn't work otherwise anywhere outside the state.
MR. BRowN (Missouri) : In our state, recently, a man from Blue Rock, Ohio, bought
an automobile in the State of Missouri. We
claimed that he should have paid us a tax and
he did pay us a tax on an eight hundred and
eleven dollar purchase. The sale was consumniated within the state and we claimed it was
taxable. Suppose that the State of Ohio had
a use or consumer's tax. This automobile is
to be used in Ohio. Would Ohio or would
you in California, say, collect a use tax on
that ?

Russian Sales Tae
Numerous and Hig

By PHILIP ZOERCHER
Chairman, Indiana State Board of Tax
Commissioners, and President of
The National Tax Association

importance to the people of every state
than the question of taxation and with it,
of course, goes the administration of these
different tax measures.
A great deal of good can come from
meetings of this kind. Different states have
different methods and there may grow a
unanimity of spirit and feeling if we get
together and discuss these matters.
There is another thing that we tax men
know. As I sometimes tell our own people,
our own field men, when they come to ie,
there are two ways of approaching the
public, the taxpayer. You can approach
him with a frown or you can approach him
with a smile and you can leave the. tapayer in a better spirit if you adopt the
latter than if you adopt the former; that is,
if you smile. You can be just as determined and just as firm in what you"saI.
and sometimes the taxpayer will go a
with a different spirit, and I know,'frosi
the looks of you folks here, that youa'
that class and believe in that spirit.
I hope and trust that you will have a

Mr. President and Members of the National Association of State Tax Administrators:
It gives me a great deal of pleasure to
welcome you to the State of Indiana, sometimes known as the "Crossroads of America."

Of course, I know you people from the
West think that we are a little presumptuous in thinking that Indiana is the cross18

very successful meeting and it is use
pQ
me to tell tax men that, if you
different opinion from that expressed kv
anyone, don't hesitate to express it beoft
by differences of opinion, in gettingt
we will iron out our difficulties and,,
real system of taxation in our
states.
Thank you, Mr. President. (A

